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WHY NEGLECT COMPARATIVE TAXATION?
JOHN C. CHoMMIE*

"The difficult task before the comparative lawyer is that
of reading the technical results against the light of a more
general political,social, and historical experience."'I
In appraising the value of making comparative legal studies
legal writers have suggested that such research. (1) gives one
greater insight into his own legal system; (2) aids in the preparation of legislation; (3) provides stimulus for reform; (4) enables
the practitioner to communicate with foreign lawyers; (5) provides
a basis for securing uniformity; (6) spurs the development of a
legal science; and, (7) is an "integral component of any programme
designed to further international understanding and peace."2
The purpose of this article is not to reappraise these values in a
tax context, but merely to suggest some profitable lines of inquiry
for the student of comparative law to follow in comparing income
tax problems in the United States and Canada. Although some
limited comparisons between Dominion and Federal tax laws have
been conducted, few have been published in the United States.3
The pursuit of useful lines of inquiry will be conducted under these
headings: (I) Legislative Policy-Making; (II) The Administrative
Process; and, (III) The Judicial Process.
I.

L.isLATrivE POLICY-MAKING

The prime policy-maker in both the United States and Canada
is, of course, the legislature. An adequate investigation of its function, however, must center around the tremendous task of analyzing the forces influencing it. To reduce the enormity of the task
only three aspects of legislative policy-making will be discussed
*Professor of Law, Dicdinson School of Law; member of the Minnesota
Bar.

1. Pekelis, Legal Techniques and Political Idiologies: A Comparative
Study, 41 Mich. L. Rev. 665 (1943).
2. Declarationof the Preparatory Committee for the Establishment of
an International Comparative Law Association, UNESCO/SS/EDC/10, 18
April 1949, cited in Schlesinger, Comparative Law 30 (1950).
3. The utility of tax comparison has been recognized. E.g., "The purpose

of this article is to outline the principal features of the Canadian law of
income taxation as it applies to the petroleum industry. In an attempt to
achieve a better understanding of the law of Canada it thi field, some compartsons with the law of the United States may be useful. There is nothing

new about this particular method of inquiry... . The general subject requires, however, more detailed exposition m order to meet the requirements
of practitioners who must work with the law from day to day." McDonald.
The Tax Treatment of Oil and Gas Transactions, 31 Can. B. Rev. 158
(1953). (Emphasis added.)
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here (1) the social forces affecting policy-making, (2) the role
of the executive in policy-making, and, (3) the major policy issues.
Social Forces Affecting Policy-lakng. The restriction of inquiry to specific legal problems leads to what Professor Rhemstem
has characterized as the mere "monographic or synoptic description of legal rules and institutes."' 4 In order, therefore, to obtain
some social background to legislative action, economic and political
forces should be studied, since these are, by observation, the most
pertinent in any study of tax policy-making.
For the purposes of a Canada-United States tax comparison
most facets of economic culture can be assumed similar, since economic theory has not been greatly nationalized throughout the
western world. The student, nevertheless, must investigate the
economic background of the particular legal problem under coiparison. For example, in a study of a similar income tax prohlem
of the two systems, attention should be given to the relative tax
burden on the groups involved as well as the position of the income
tax in the whole structure. And viewing the effects of taxation as
a type of economic force it seems the conceptions here cannot be
safely ignored. In appraising economic forces we must often operate
as Randolph Paul has said on "cloudy conjecture." In any comparative study, however, limitations based on uncertain underlying
economic data are going to present themselves and it will be necessary to work with the empirical evidence that is available.
The investigation of political forces allows even fewer assumptions of similarity than does a survey of economic forces. Here,
however, in one sense the task of the lawyer-researcher would not
seem as dfficult, in a broad sense legislative techniques and methods
are important components of the modern legal discipline. In any
4. Rhemstem, Teaching Comparative Law, 5 U. Chi. L. Rev. 615
(1938).
"There are certain dangers in the comparison of solutions to problems
reached by various legal systems. There is the danger of superficiality, the
temptation to conclude that since the defendant is liable under similar facts
Hence it is
in Peru and Michigan therefore the laws are the same.
suggested that a conception of the end of 'compaiative' law as the comparison of laws of various countries by examining the solutions reached to specific
problems does not state the whole purpose, since it fails to take into account
the important factor that one of the keys to the interpretation of the result
may well lie in the method which has been employed." Stone, The End To
Be Served by Comparative Law, 25 Tul. L. Rev. 325, 329-330 (1951).
"Yet one must not disparage unduly comparative law as a mere comparison of laws or rules of law. Rules of law are a necessary and highly
important element in any body of authoritative legal materials. They cannot
be too well considered or too well formulated." Pound, What May We Ex
pect From Comparative Law?, 22 A. B. A. J. 56, 57 (1936).
5. Paul, Taxation In The United States 753 (1954).
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event; especially demanding of inquiry are comparisons of legislative
machinery and the pressure group activity successful and unsuccessful in influencing the legislature. A study of these social forces
should lay the groundwork for the student's more detailed comparison.
The Role of the Executive in Legislative Policy-Making. Both

in Canada and in the United States the Government and the Administration perform a vital role in the initiation of tax measures.
Yet there seem to be sufficient differences, springing to some extent
from the differences in the nature of party solidarity, as to affect
markedly the final legislative policy expression. The Cabinet in
Canada is more dominant than its counterpart in the United States,
and the "backbenchers" do not seem to provide the stabilizing (or
obstructionist, depending on the viewpoint) force characteristic of

the minority party in the United States Congress.0
The part played by these differences demands that they be taken
into account in drawing conclusions in many problem studies. They
command attention particularly in considering such vital policy
issues' as statutory complexity where the role of political compromise is so important.
Major Policy Issues. Most real conflict in the legislative taxing
process seems to center in the area of the distribution of the tax
load. It is here that comparison with treatment in Canada might
well prove to be most rewarding. Comparative lawyers have long
recognized the value of comparative studies as aids in the preparation of legislation.- But aside from a few studies conducted by the
Treasury, s comparative research of this type does not seem to have
intrigued even the more competent tax scholars in the United
States.
At a second level of policy-making-the policies determining
6. For a recent comment on the dominant role of the Cabinet in the
legislative process of Canada see Professor Willis' remarks in Note, 29
Can. B. Rev. 296 (1951). For an excellent discussion of the role of the
executive in making tax policy in the United States see Blough, The Federal
Taxing Process (1952).
7. Professor Escarra relates: "Thus, immediately after the founding
of this society [of Comparative Legislation in 1869] the practice appeared in
France of accompanying drafts of a proposed law submitted to Parliament.
with accounts of the legislation on the same subject in other countries."
Escarra, The Aar of Comparative Law, 7 Temp. L. Q. 296, 300 (1933).
8. Dr. Blough 'relates one reaction to one comparative study made by
the Treasury during the hearings preceding the 1943 Revenue Act: "An
informational pamphlet of the Treasury's Division of Tax Research comparing excise taxes in the United States, Canada, and Great Britain was condemned as propaganda for the Treasury tax views by a prominent Republican member of the Appropriations Committee." Blough, op. cit. supra
note 6, at 261.
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the technical tax structure-comparisons might also prove fruitful.
It is here that a considerable divergence may be found that could
lead to valuable insights to the social forces bearing on existing
policies in both systems. For example, a comparative study of the
reasons behind Canada's refusal to recognize intra-family transfers
of income producing property 9 or a comparison of the tax treatment of family partnerships might well provide the needed insights
for reform in both countries. And Canada's general exclusion of
capital gains from taxation is another example of the differences in
tax load distribution between the two countries. A study here may
well provide aid in solving the perplexing problem of preferential
treatment of capital gains taxation in the United States.
Provisions setting the pattern of general administration, review,
and returns, however, may not require a close study of backing
social forces, since these rules affect all taxpayers. But even here
mere descriptive comparison of the effectiveness of these laws should
prove valuable.
In sum, clarification of the social forces that create the major
policy issues, particularly in the tax load distributive area, is such
an important function in a democratic order, that the hard-pressed
policy-maker needs all possible aid to enable him to render sound
value judgments. Canadian comparison is one further aid researchers can give him.

II.

THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS

The range of inquiry into the administrative process, of course,
depends upon the purpose behind the investigation. The tax practitioner, the legislative policy-maker, and the Treasury Department
each might be interested in different aspects of the problem of
administrative enforcement. Broadly, however, it would seem that
valuable comparisons could be made in considering such problems as
auditing procedures, penal sanctions, judicial reaction to enforcement policies, uniformity of administration, and the effectiveness
of enforcement within particular economic groups. For example, in
both countries self-assessment of income tax is a basic administrative technique. Yet in the United States the effectiveness of the
income tax through the collection technique of withholding is considered notoriously high on income from wages and salaries compared to income from agricultural activities and others outside the
orbit of the withholding provisions. A comparative study here might
9. Income Tax Act, R. S. C. c. 148 (1952), §§ 21-22 (Canada).
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well provide the understanding needed for a more effective and
fair enforcement policy in the United States.
The most serious obstacle in conducting studies in the admimstrative area is the lack of descriptive materials. Apparently much
of the needed material can be supplied only by on-the-spot studies
of enforcement conducted by competent tax scholars with practical
experience in tax administration. ° And flowing from a less complex system is a second limiting factor: lack of Canadian experience
with comparable enforcement techniques.
Despite these limitations productive comparisons of tax administrative problems can still be made. One possible comparison
is Canada's use of broad ministerial discretion as opposed to the
limited discretion given the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
The history of ministerial discretion in Canada can be related in
terms of the struggle of the organized professions-accounting and
law-to reduce such discretion in the administration of the income
tax. When the Income Tax Act was being considered in 1948 it
was stated to a special committee of the Canadian Senate that
"appearances of discretionary power ... [o] curred in 95 sections
or subsections" of the Income War Tax Act.1 ' With the enactment
of the Income Tax Act most of these discretionary powers were
withdrawn from the Minister. Section 138 of the Act, however,
gives a broad discretion to the Treasury Board to ignore transactions where "one of the main purposes for a transaction. . was the
improper avoidance or reduction of taxes. . .

."12

No American

10. Professor Schwartz conducted two such on-the-spot inquiries in
his general investigations of English and French administrative law. See
Schwartz, Law and the Executive in Britain: A Comparative Study (1949) ;
Schwartz, French Administrative Law and the Common Law World (1954).
11. Canadian Tax Foundation, The Income Tax Revision, 25 Can. B.
Rev. 1121, 1126 (1947).
12. Section 138(1) of the Act provides: "Where the Treasury Board
has decided that one of the main purposes for a transaction or transactions
effected before or after the coming into force of this Act was improper
avoidance or reduction of taxes that might otherwise have become payable
under this Act, the Income War Tax Act, or The Excess Profits Tax Act,
1940, the Treasury Board may give such directions as it considers appropriate
to counteract the avoidance or reduction." Section 138(3) provides: "Where
a direction has been given under this section, tax shall be collected or assessed
or re-assessed and collected, notwithstanding any other provision of this or
any other Act in accordance therewith."
The Treasury Board, a committee of the Cabinet, "consists of the Mimster of Finance . . and any five members of the Queens Privy Council for
The Deputy Minister of Finance is the ex-officio secretary of the
Canada..
Board." CCH,,Canadian Master Tax Guide 275 (10th ed. 1955).
Sections 138(1) and (3), identical in wording with §§ 126(1) and (3)
of the 1948 Income Tax Act, have been bitterly attacked by committees of
the Canadian Bar Association and the Dominion Association of Chartered
Accountants. Recommendations for Amendment of the Income Tax Act. 27
Can. B. Rev. 443 (1949). Cf., Willis, Recent Trends in CanadianIncome Tax
Law, 9 U. Toronto L. J. 42, 46-49 (1951).
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Congress has ever exhibited such confidence (or faith) in the Secretary of Treasury or the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.1 It
should be noted that generally an exercise of ministerial discretion
under the Income War Tax Act was reviewable by the courts, but
the scope of review was quite limited. Since 1948, however, it seems
that section 138 stands to a large extent as a "silent policeman,"
seldom exercised, but ever present to haunt the Canadian tax
planner in much the same manner as "Gregory's Ghost"' 4 haunts
the tax lawyer planning a corporate reorganization in the United
States.
Undoubtedly many forces have contributed to Canadian confidence in ministerial discretion and the suspicion with which it has
apparently been viewed in the United States. This, however, is no
place for a brief on either side of the controversial problem. It is
enough to note that the problem exists as a possible fruitful area
for comparative study
III.

THE JUDICIAL PROCESS

A comparative tax study involving the United States and
Canada that ignored the judicial machinery and techniques of the
two countries would run the risk of superficiality For this reason
the research student should examine comparative tax problems in
the light of these aspects of the judicial process (1) the machinery
of review, (2) the techniques of interpretation, and, (3) the
notions of the judicial function. Following these discussions a final
note will be added on the interpretative issues.
The Machinery of Review. A comparison of policy or interpretative problems must include a consideration of the taxpayer's right
to be heard. Awareness of the fundamental notion common to the
United States and Canada (and perhaps to all of the western world)
of a day in court is clearly not enough. Adequate comparison requires answers to such questions as these How are disputes with
the collector handled? What machinery is available for settling disputes? Who has the burden of proof?
Although the functioning of the Tax Court of the United States
as an independent specialized organ has won widespread satisfaction, development of a similar court in Canada is in an incipient
13. Even the Commissioner's traditional power over accounting procedures has, to some extent, been invaded by the LIFO provisions of the
Code. And judicial limitations on § 482 (§ 45 of the 1939 Code) and § 269
(§ 129 of the 1939 Code) are well known chapters in the history of administrative discretion in the United States.
14. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U. S. 465 (1935)
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stage. A survey of the first thirty years of income taxation in
Canada is as difficult at the judicial level as at the administrative
level for much the same reasons. The Exchequer Court, Supreme
Court, and Privy Council have produced few cases.' 5 Lacking both
materials and a unifying court such as our Tax Court the student's
first inclination in comparing enforcement at the trial level will
probably be to turn to the administrative process for techniques
furnislng a similar function. Such an approach, however, can only
lead to conjecture, since the Minister with his broad discretion
-issues few regulations and no rulings. While this state of affairs in
Canada hardly resulted in the calamity often predicted in such
situations, it certainly was not conducive *to an orderly development of a body of tax law responsive to the needs of a democratic
order. It was bound to meet resistance if for no other reason than
that it was shrouded in secrecy.' 6 Undoubtedly this overpaints the
picture. But assuming its essential accuracy its full story could well
serve as an object lesson in administrative discretion.
In the attempts at solution of the problem of ministerial discretion with a system of appeals, Canadians had, in 1948, at least
two established systems in the common law world upon which to
draw-the United States and the United Kingdom. In broad outlines the Income Tax Appeal Board that was established in Canada
resembles more the structure of the Tax Court than the localized
English system of Commissioners of Income Tax. The Canadian
structure of course has features of its own such as permitting a
by-passing of the Appeal Board by the taling of an appeal direct
to the Exchequer Court. A detailed description of the system, however, is not intended here. It is enough to suggest the significance
for comparative study of the 1948 reforms including the establish15. It has been pointed out that "less than 150 tax appeals" were decided by the Exchequer Court between 1917 (the date of the enactment of

the first income tax) and 1947. Thorn, Appeal Procedure tnder the Income
Tax Act, 29 Can. B. Rev. 139, 140 (1951).
16. "This situation [the broad ministerial discretion in the Income

War Tax Act] has undesirable consequences for all concerned. For the tax-

payer the position is inequitable in principle because it is uncertain in
practice. Perhaps the gravest practical objection is delay and difficulty in
determining actual or prospective tax liability in cases which depend upon
the -Minister's decision..
"For the administration, the scope of the powers involved and the absence of judicial guidance have prevented the development of uniform and
tested principles which the extent of the Minister's responsibility requires to

support it and which the taxpayer is entitled to know.
"For the law itself, the same factors lead into the dark; and, lacking
the opinion of the courts upon any of the matters thus removed from their
jurisdiction, Parliament has not been in a position to review and restate the
law in the light of experience." Canadian Tax Foundation, supra note 11, at
1126-1127.
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ment of the Income Tax Appeal Board as a substitute for many of
the withdrawn ministerial discretionary powers.
From the Canadian viewpoint the thirty years' experience of
the United States with the Tax Court should provide a mine of
information from which to draw material for adaptation to Canadian conditions in developing the Income Tax Appeal Board into a
more useful institution. This has in fact been suggested by a prominent member of the Canadian tax bar.- From the viewpoint of
reform in the United States a number of values may be obtained.
For example, Canadian experience with appeals to a single federal
tribunal (the Exchequer Court) should prove to be of some value
with regard to the perplexing problem in the United States of ten
courts of appeal often rendering conflicting decisions. Perhaps the
well-known Griswold Plan for a single court of tax appeals could
be profitably re-examined in the light of Canadian experience with
the Exchequer Court.
The Techniques of Interpretation. The values flowing from
clearer insights to the juristic reasoning process are self-evident.
Comparative lawyers have long recognized the worth of the comparative method for this purpose. In a tax context, however, little
progress has been made in this area. It is suggested that a comparison of United States and Canadian interpretative techniques
would prove fruitful along two lines of inquiry First, for the purpose of evaluating results in a comparative study of any tax policy
problem. Second, for the purpose of gaining insights to the problem of interpreting tax legislation on both sides of the border.
In the first place where the purpose of inquiry is a policy or
substantive problem, a careful consideration of the techniques and
methods of interpretation for evaluation purposes seems indispensable. The crucial nature of this problem for the comparative
tax research student is ably demonstrated in a recent work of Professor LaBrie entitled The Meaning of Income ti The Law of
Income Tax.'8
This work is limited to a critical analysis of the English and
Canadian case law which is background to some of the major income tax problems in Canada. As such it has received excellent
reviews by competent Canadian tax scholars.19 But it is more.
While directed to what LaBrie considers the failure of both Eng17 Thom. Appeal Procedureunder the Income Tax Act, 29 Can. B. Rev.
139, 145-146 (1951).
18. Toronto University of Toronto Press (1953)
19. E.g., Covert, Book Review, 10 U. Toronto L. J. 288 (1954), Vine-

berg, Book Review, 31 Can. B. Rev. 831 (1953).
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lish and Canadian courts to reflect correctly business principles in
developing a legal income concept for tax purposes, the book is
revealing of Canadian and English judicial techniques in the taxing
process. Here, as distinguished from the liberal practices of the
American courts, is a judicial interpretative methodology largely
limited to a scrupulous regard for the words of a statute and the
doctrine of stare dectsis. Largely ignored are underlying commercial practices and, except for some lip service paid to what is termed
the "mischief rule,"20 an almost total disregard of legislative history. Professor LaBrie's own analysis, devoted almost exclusively
to tax concepts and precedents, echoes the Canadian juristic reasoning process in the tax context. While there may be some doubt that
English and Canadian judges have been as literal as is often alleged,
it seems clear that there is little in the English-Canadian interpretative history that resembles the trend in the United States illustrated by such landmarks as the Horst-Eubank, Clifford, Gregory
and Earl cases.2 1 It is therefore evident that in evaluating judicial
,behavior in a comparative tax study the differences in the use of
techniques of interpretation in the United States and Canada must
be taken into consideration.
In the second place where the purpose of inquiry is method itself,
as distinguished from a-policy or substantive problem, comparison
would also seem to be fruitful. A scrupulous regard for the words
of a statute is hardly an undesirable judicial characteristic. Nor, it
is suggested, is judicial effort to get at the policy of a statute by
resort to underlying social facts and legislative history It would
seem evident that tax students on both sides of the border could
learn much from each other that would give greater insight to interpretative methodology at home.
From a United States viewpoint the tax student could possibly
profit in a perusal of Canadian decisions, particularly as articulated
by Professor LaBrie in his formulation and use of legal concepts.
For example, we admit of a large and growing body of judge-made
or common law infederal tax jurisprudence. Yet its full utilization
demands articulation beyond efforts made along this line to date.
Professor LaBrie shows the Canadian and English judges at their
literal best. It should be noted that though his manuscript Nwas
essentially completed before the advent of the Income Tax Appeal
20. For a recent analysis of Canadian cases, consisting largely of court

and Appeal, Board tax opinions, indicating a liberal trend in interpretation,
see McGregor, Literal or Liberal?,32 Can. B. Rev. 281 (1954).
21. Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U. S. 122 (1940); Helvering v. Horst,
311 U. S. 112 (1940) ; Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U. S. 331 (1940) Gregory
v. Helvering, 293 U. S. 465 (1935); Lucas v. Earl, 281 U. S. 111 (1930).
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Board, as was pointed out by one of his reviewers, 22 what evidence
there is indicates that the Board is committed to the same literal
23

approach.

From a Canadian viewpoint the judicious use of legislative history and social facts in the United States may reveal some of the
short-comings of a strict interpretative method. For example, it
may be that the strict interpretation of the Canadian courts is one of
the primary causes of the Income Tax Act's rigid rules against
evasion with their frequent resultant hardship in individual cases.
And strict interpretation may also reveal that the process of milking
each word for meaning may result in24 ignoring the limitations of
words in conveying ideas or thoughts.
In sum, there would seem to be few surer roads to an understanding of the juristic reasoning process than by a comparison of
the manner in which judges handle such matters as legal concepts,
precedents, social facts and legislative history
Notzons of the Judicial Function. Intimately related to the
various techniques of interpretation is the matter of the notions of
the proper judicial function of a court in the tax structure of a
democratic order. This matter, however, is difficult to discuss out
of the context of a particular problem. It is most often analyzed
in the context of the function of a court to prevent evasion or in
22. Vineberg, supra note 19.
23. "It can, I think, be safely said that there are not, and are not likely
to be, any 'trends' in interpretation. The Canadian courts stick, and will
probably continue to stick, closely to the time-honoured rule of Partington
v. Attorney-General that 'if the Crown
cannot bring the subject within
the letter of the law, the subject is free, however apparently within the spirit
of the law the case might otherwise appear to be. In other words, if there be
admissible, in any statute, what is called an equitable construction, certainly
such a construction is not admissible in a taxing statute, when you can
simply adhere to the words of the statute.' [ (1869) L. R. 4 H. L. 100, 122 (per
Lord Cairns))." Willis, Recent Trends In Canadian Income Tax Law, 9
U. Toronto L. J.42, 42-43 (1951)
24. Professor LaBrie has collaborated with J. R. Westlake in a monograph. Deductions under the Income War Tax Act: A Return to Business
Principles (1948). This work appears to be a preview of Part III, "Deductions," in LaBrie's The Meaning of Income in the Law of Income Tax. The
monograph has been critically reviewed by Professor Laskin wherein tile
limitations inherent in analysis limited to the literal words of a statute are
ably pointed out: "It is this reviewer's submission that there are limits to the
squeezing of words of a statute to make them distil a particular kind of
juice. If it be permissible to make the distinction, the fault which the authors
find lies more in the application of the statute than in its mere construction,
They contend that the courts, and especially the Supreme Court of Canada,
have not construed the statute in terms of commonly accepted business prinuciples. But since the courts have insisted that they are applying business
principles, the quarrel between them and the authors can hardly be resolved
by insistence on a more scrupulous regard for the words of the statute. The
solution lies outside the statute." Laskin, Book Review, 8 U. Toronto L. J.
185 (1949).
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connection with the desirability of giving relief in hardship cases.2
Both subjects, judicial avoidance of evasion and affordance of relief, -when examined in the context of the whole taxing process
should be valuable subjects of comparison. In Canada, of course, this
function is largely performed by the Minister or Treasury Board
in using their discretionary powers.
Perhaps the principal value flowing from comparison of the
notions of the judicial function in tax controversies would be the
contribution such studies might make toward the development of
tax theory. Most students of taxation would admit the lack of a
satisfactorily developed tax theory in the United States. For example, progressive taxation in the federal tax structure is accepted
as a political reality. Yet notwithstanding an extreme expenditure
of intellectual energy in attempts to justify it, it can be demonstrated that we are in reality paying but lip service to the abilityto-pay principle; that the tax structure as a whole is regressive and
ability-to-pay has no real meaning except in the nebulous area of
taxpayer morale. If this is true, it suggests an area of danger in a
democratic order.
In a search for an approach that will lead to a satisfactory tax
theory, perhaps we can profit from Professor Stone's recent sug-gestion that comparison of laws leads to comparison of methods
used to implement the laws and "from a study of the methods
employed we are led to a study of the forces behind the selection of
method, in other words to the legal theories."2-'
The Interpretative Issues. Of primary interest to many tax
practitioners would be comparative studies of interpretative issues.
Here, of course, it has long been recognized that precedent from
other fiscal systems is of limited value. Except for an occasional
reference to English cases in some of the early tax opinions foreign
precedents are rarely used in the United States. The dangers inherent in the use of foreign decisions are readily apparent. Where
the foreign decision involves the interpretation of a foreign statute
25. See, e.g., LaBrie, The Role of the Courts In Tax Avoidance, 3 Can.

Tax J. 326 (1955).
26. Stone, The End To Be Seraed By Comparative Law, 25 Tul. L.
Rev.325, 331 (1951).
"Just as the spuit of every language manifests itself in the peculiar
meaning and scope of words for which there is no exact translation in other
languages, so also the more pronounced characteristics of each legal system

express themselves m concepts which have no exact equivalent In other
words, one and the same reality is not abbreviated or symbolized in the same
way by the concepts of the various legal systems. Consequently, in order to
understand, the reasoning process of a jurist, it is most desirable to go
outside the boundaries of one's own intellectual environment." Brutau, Realivm

in Comparative Law, 3 Am. J. Comp. L. 42, 43 (1954). (Footnotes omitted.)
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it is clear that, except in rare instances where the foreign statute is
par inaterta with the local statute, the use of the foreign interpretation would not only be valueless but dangerous. It is interesting
to note, however, the contrast between the United States and
Canada in the use of foreign decisions and the light that such contrast sheds on the interpretative technique of the use of precedents.
Where the interpretative issues have a common base, however,
the tax practitioner in the United States might well obtain valuable
information by analyzing the Canadian decisions for a fresh approach even though he cannot cite them as precedents. For example, the value of property acquired by gift is excluded from the
definition of taxale income in both Canada and the United
States.2 7 Here something more than a mere "squeezing of words
of a statute" is needed in order to solve many controversies involving the issue of whether a particular payment was a gift or, for
example, taxable income as compensation for services. The practitioner by an analysis of Canadian decisions on the subject may
well find new insights to a particular gift problem with which lie
is concerned. And, of course, comparison of interpretative issues
can also round out a comparative study of a policy issue.
IV

CONCLUSION

This discourse hardly constitutes a catalog of the numerous
benefits that would flow from comparing income tax problems in
the United States with those in Canada. Left untouched is the
area of tax practice and its many problems. Today, for example, the
tax practitioner is grappling with the problem of marking out the
area of service between the lawyer and the accountant.28 Would
not a comparative study of the similar problem-or an inquiry into
why there is not a similar problem-in Canada suggest enlightenment and insights to the struggle at home ?29 The benefit to the
27 Int. Rev. Code § 102(a) (United States), Income War Tax Act,
§ 3(l) (a) (Canada). The Income Tax Act does not contain a specific exclusion but the "exclusion from income of amounts received by gift is well
established in English common law and has been reaffirmed by the Canadian
courts." LaBrie. op. cit. supra note 18, at 197 (Footnotes omitted.)
28. See e.g., Griswold, We Can Stop The Lawyer-Accountant Conflict
Over Tax Practice Now- Four Recommendations, 2 J. Taxation 130
(1955) , Note, 39 Minn. L. Rev. 873 (1955).
29. It should be noted that Dean Griswold relates "I have shown the
Agran opinion [denying an accountant recovery of the value of his professional services on grounds he was practicing law] to an English solicitor.
He finds it very interesting, but says that there would be no question in
England that an accountant could properly do what Mr. Agran did, and be
paid for it. He thinks that the solicitors may have been somewhat asleep and
remiss, but there is no doubt as to what the legal status of the English
accountant is in this area." Griswold, stipra, note 28, at 137
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231

public from a satisfactory solution of this problem is self-evident,
not to mention the salutary effect on the two professions. Perhaps
the majority of the lkenefits suggested from comparative tax studies
are of this nature-benefits that would flow to the public as a whole.
Yet there are more immediate values of a personal nature as well.
The flow of American capital into Canada suggests a practical need
for knowledge of things Canadian. Personal advantage here is obvious. The prestige from comparative research and its effect as a
countermeasure to atrophy to say nothing of the satisfaction flowing
from contributing to tax theory and policy, are all suggestive of
personal values.
Undoubtedly there will be many instances where the lack of
accessible materials will render comparative research in depth impracticable. But in the larger urban centers and the better law
school libraries sufficient materials are available. The principal obstacle here would seem to be simply inertia or a failure to appreciate
the values flowing from such research.

